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Toward a Better Understanding of
the Relationship between Belief in
the Paranormal and Statistical Bias:
The Potential Role of Schizotypy
Neil Dagnall*, Andrew Denovan, Kenneth Drinkwater, Andrew Parker and Peter Clough
Manchester Metropolitan University, Manchester, UK
The present paper examined relationships between schizotypy (measured by the
Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experience; O-LIFE scale brief), belief in the
paranormal (assessed via the Revised Paranormal Belief Scale; RPBS) and proneness to
statistical bias (i.e., perception of randomness and susceptibility to conjunction fallacy).
Participants were 254 volunteers recruited via convenience sampling. Probabilistic
reasoning problems appeared framed within both standard and paranormal contexts.
Analysis revealed positive correlations between the Unusual Experience (UnExp)
subscale of O-LIFE and paranormal belief measures [RPBS full scale, traditional
paranormal beliefs (TPB) and new age philosophy]. Performance on standard problems
correlated negatively with UnExp and belief in the paranormal (particularly the TPB
dimension of the RPBS). Consideration of specific problem types revealed that
perception of randomness associated more strongly with belief in the paranormal than
conjunction; both problem types related similarly to UnExp. Structural equation modeling
specified that belief in the paranormal mediated the indirect relationship between UnExp
and statistical bias. For problems presented in a paranormal context a framing effect
occurred. Whilst UnExp correlated positively with conjunction proneness (controlling for
perception of randomness), there was no association between UnExp and perception
of randomness (controlling for conjunction).
Keywords: schizotypy, paranormal belief, heuristical bias, perception of randomness, conjunction fallacy
INTRODUCTION
Heuristics are simple mental rules or shortcuts, which ease cognitive load and facilitate rapid
formation of judgments and decisions (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). While heuristics typical
yield reasonable judgments, they can also produce systematic deviations from logic and probability
(Costello and Mathison, 2014). Recent research indicates that belief in the paranormal is associated
with susceptibility to heuristic bias, particularly misrepresentation of chance (Dagnall et al., 2007,
2014, 2016) and conjunction fallacy (Rogers et al., 2009, 2011, 2016). The present paper examined
the degree to which level of schizotypy influenced this relationship. This was a logical extension
to previous research because schizotypy correlates with belief in the paranormal and is associated
with proneness to reasoning and cognitive bias. For instance, jumping to conclusions (Moritz and
Woodward, 2005; Sellen et al., 2005) and tendency to discount disconfirmatory evidence (Buchy
et al., 2007).
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Schizotypy is a rich and complex psychopathology concept
(Lenzenweger, 2015). Researchers use schizotypy as a tool for
investigating schizophrenia and psychosis associated phenomena
because schizotypy measures assess non-clinical populations and
thus avoid confounds associated with schizophrenic patients (i.e.,
symptom severity and general decline in cognitive performance)
(Claridge, 1988; Yoon et al., 2008). The relationship between
schizotypy and schizophrenia, however, is not a simple one.
Different views exist on the continuum between schizotypy,
mental health and mental illness (i.e., quasi-dimensional,
dimensional and fully dimensional). The present paper restricts
itself to the notion that schizotypy is a personality trait (Claridge
and Beech, 1995) assessed on a continuum, ranging from
relative psychological health to schizophrenia (psychosis)
(Barrantes-Vidal et al., 2015). This perspective compliments
the observations that schizotypy presents within the general
population and does not necessarily result in psychopathology.
Indeed, non-clinical community respondents can obtain
high schizotypy scores without exhibiting schizophrenia
spectrum symptoms (Dembin´ska-Krajewska and Rybakowski,
2014).
The inclusion of schizotypy is a logical extension to previous
work for several reasons. Firstly, there is a well-documented
positive correlation between schizotypy and belief in the
paranormal (Hergovich et al., 2008). Hergovich et al. (2008)
found that schizotypy predicted key facets of belief in the
paranormal (i.e., precognition, psi, witchcraft and spiritualism).
This association arises in part from construct overlap. One of
the Schizotypal Personality Disorder diagnostic criteria refers
specifically to odd beliefs or magical thinking (Hergovich
et al., 2008). This relationship suggests that schizotypy may
also influence correlates of paranormal belief. Secondly, the
directional nature of the correlation between schizotypy and
paranormal belief is uncertain. Specifically, it is unclear whether
belief in the paranormal produces high schizotypy scores,
schizotypy promotes paranormal beliefs (Hergovich et al.,
2008), or the relationship is explained by a common third
variable.
The association is complicated further because schizotypy and
belief in the paranormal interact differently with related beliefs.
For example, paranormal belief (vs. level of schizotypy) better
predicts traditional religious contents, superstitious thoughts and
belief in the existence of extraordinary life forms (Hergovich
et al., 2008).
Finally, previous work indicates that belief in the paranormal
and schizotypy influence perception of causal relationships.
Principally, perception of illusory causality and proneness to
connectedness (the tendency to perceive co-occurring events
as meaningfully associated). Perception of randomness in turn
is likely to affect appreciation of chance (randomness) and
susceptibility to heuristical bias. Thus, the present study tested
the previously unassessed assertion that schizotypy effects
susceptibility to heuristic bias.
Paranormal belief is moderately associated with probability
misjudgment (Blackmore and Troscianko, 1985; Bressan, 2002;
Dagnall et al., 2007, 2014). A seminal example is Blackmore
and Troscianko (1985), who reported that believers in psi (vs.
non-believers) performed less well on probability judgment tasks.
Psi refers to the unknown factor in extrasensory perception and
psychokinesis experiences. Subsequent research produced similar
findings, but focused on a limited number of reasoning problem
types. Observing this, Dagnall et al. (2007) conducted a study
including a range of problem-solving tasks. Items evaluated four
key reasoning domains: perception of randomness (judging the
likelihood of obtaining strings/sequences), base rate (probability
of a stated outcome in relation to presented information),
conjunction fallacy (determining whether co-occurring events
were more likely to occur than single, constituent events)
and derivation of expected value (evaluating odds in order to
maximize pay-outs). Performance on perception of randomness
tasks emerged as the best predictor of level of paranormal
belief. This finding supported the notion that believers in
the paranormal possess a tendency to perceive random events
(coincidences) as causally related (meaningful) (Brugger and
Taylor, 2003).
Relatedly, Rogers (Rogers et al., 2009, 2011) reported a positive
correlation between susceptibility to conjunction fallacy and
belief in the paranormal. Conjunction fallacy refers to instances
where event co-occurrence [P(A&B)] (conjunction), is rated
more likely than constituent events, P(A) or P(B) (Tversky
and Kahneman, 1983; Hertwig and Chase, 1998). The work of
Rogers is important because few previous studies considered the
role conjunction plays in the development and maintenance of
paranormal beliefs.
Using a specially designed Scenario Judgments Questionnaire
(SJQ), (Rogers et al., 2009) found that paranormal believers
(vs. non-believers) made more conjunction errors and that
context effected susceptibility to conjunction; standard problems
produced more errors than those presented in a paranormal
framework (Rogers et al., 2009). The SJQ is a measure
comprised of 16 conjunction vignettes divided into non-
paranormal/conventional (e.g., queuing for airport coffee) and
paranormal (e.g., alleged precognition) events. Rogers et al.
(2011) reproduce the finding that believers (vs. non-believers)
produced more conjunction errors, but failed to replicate the
outcome that performance varied as a function of problem type
(conventional vs. paranormal).
Conjunction effects are typical weak and significant outcomes
reported inconsistently across the literature. Noting this,
Dagnall et al. (2014) investigated further the degree to which
specific probabilistic biases (perception of randomness, base
rate, conjunction fallacy and probability) were associated with
belief in the paranormal and proneness to reality testing (RT)
deficits (Inventory of Personality Organization-Reality Testing;
Lenzenweger et al., 2001). To ensure results were not an
artifact of the paranormal scale used the study employed a
range of measures (Manchester Metropolitan University-New,
MMU-N, Dagnall et al., 2010a,b; Revised Paranormal Belief
Scale, RPBS, Tobacyk and Milford, 1983; Tobacyk, 2004; and
Australian Sheep–Goat Scale., ASGS, Thalbourne and Delin,
1993).
Multiple regression revealed the best predictor of belief in
the paranormal and proneness to RT deficits was perception
of randomness. Performance on conventional conjunctions
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correlated only with the Tradition Paranormal Beliefs (TPB)
dimension of the RPBS. Paranormal conjunctions correlated with
both paranormal belief and proneness to RT deficits. Overall
findings indicated that conjunction was not strongly associated
with belief in the paranormal.
Considering these findings, Rogers (2014) in the context of
general paranormal belief concluded that conjunction represents
a particular instance of misrepresentation of chance (see Dagnall
et al., 2016). This notion is consistent with the small reported
effect sizes and the observation that conjunction adds no/little
unique variance to regression models including perception of
randomness (Dagnall et al., 2014). Cumulatively, results suggest
that susceptibility to conjunction indirectly indexes perception
of randomness. Findings agree with Bressan’s (2002) general
proposition that believers in the paranormal possess a lower
subjective chance threshold, which inclines them to perceive
unrelated events as causally related.
Schizotypy also influences perceptions of causality and
connectedness. Specifically, illusory causation is associated with
symptoms related to positive schizotypy, principally magical
ideation (Rominger et al., 2011). Within high schizotypes this
manifests as a tendency to see meaning within random patterns
(Gianotti et al., 2001; Farias et al., 2005). A specific example
is the propensity to view coincidences as causally related
(Diaconis and Mosteller, 1989). More generally, susceptibility to
illusory causality correlates with scores on cognitive-perceptual
measures, such as delusional ideation (Bressan, 2002). In the
context of belief in the paranormal, illusory causation may
manifest as the tendency to perceive random events as causally
related.
The relationship between schizotypy and illusory causation,
however, is not a simple one (Fyfe et al., 2008). Fyfe et al. (2008)
examined the association between schizotypy and propensity to
see connections between unrelated stimuli or events (apophenia)
and found a positive association on only one of a series
of tasks (triangles). Schizotypy failed to correlate significantly
with performance on animated contingency and stories tasks.
Consequently, Fyfe et al. (2008) concluded that within healthy
individuals, the tendency to perceive connectedness represents
a weak effect, apparent only under certain conditions (i.e.,
situations where high ambiguity exists).
Rominger et al. (2011) explains illusory causation in terms
of loose cognitive control. Specifically, broader or less rigid
associative networks and weaker inhibition of irrelevant memory
content. Poorer appreciation of chance may also be associated
with allusive thinking or looseness of associations (Rominger
et al., 2011). Studies report individuals high in positive
schizotypal symptoms (vs. low) perceive more meaning within
random patterns and generate a higher number of unusual
words (Gianotti et al., 2001; Farias et al., 2005). In addition,
individuals high in delusional ideation seek less information prior
to reaching a decision. This expresses as the inclination to jump
to conclusions, where hypotheses related to decision-making
process are accepted or rejected prematurely.
Within delusional individuals, the propensity to make
inaccurate judgments based on insufficient information may
contribute to delusion formation and maintenance (Garety and
Freeman, 1999). Collectively, studies indicate that schizotypy
is associated with inappropriate attribution of causation and
misperception of randomness (factors linked also with belief in
the paranormal).
Whilst belief in the paranormal and schizotypy are both
associated with misperception of chance and illusory causation,
their relative contribution to heuristic bias requires exposition.
A useful starting point is the work of Williams and Irwin
(1991), who delineated paranormal belief systems as a rational
(if deviant) attempt to achieve a metacognitive understanding
of the world, is useful. Williams and Irwin (1991) proposed
that belief in the paranormal represents believers’ subjective
efforts to structure the world in terms of magical notions
of causation. Paranormal beliefs act as a framework for
structuring odd beliefs and/or magical thinking (schizotypal
related cognitions). Believers perform poorly on tasks related to
perception of randomness because they engage in a sophisticated
form of internal reasoning founded on magical ideation. This
represents an individual worldview based upon a subjective
preferential thinking style, rather than a defective understanding
of probability.
This rational view contrasts with the conventional
interpretation, which attributes endorsement of paranormal
beliefs within schizotypes to impaired psychological functioning
(cognitive, perceptual and affective distortions); full-blown
schizophrenic symptoms encompass the tendency to embrace
paranormal attributions alongside a lack of self-awareness.
Within sub-clinical populations, explanations based upon
thinking style preference are more apposite, given the prosaic
nature of paranormal beliefs.
The Present Study
This paper tested a series of predictions examining relationships
between schizotypy, belief in the paranormal and statistical bias.
Hypotheses considered the dimensional structural of schizotypy
and the factorial composition of paranormal belief in order
to assess which sub-measures were most strongly associated
with general and specific (misrepresentation of chance and
conjunction fallacy) propensity to probabilistic reasoning bias.
Particularly, the study examined the degree to which belief in the
paranormal mediated the relationship between schizotypy and
statistical bias.
The O-LIFE assessed level of schizotypy. The O-LIFE
developed from work on the personality approach to measuring
schizotypy, whilst other scales, such as the Schizotypal
Personality Questionnaire-Brief (Raine and Benishay, 1995),
derive from clinical work based on clinical measurement tools.
For this reason and because the target sample was normal
healthy individuals the O-LIFE was considered most appropriate
(Mason, 2015).
Schizotypy and Belief in the Paranormal
Acknowledging preceding work, the researchers hypothesized
that the Unusual Experiences (UnExp) dimension of the
O-LIFE scale would best predict belief in the paranormal.
The UnExp subscale assesses positive symptoms of psychosis
and contains items measuring susceptibility to perceptual
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aberrations, magical thinking and hallucinations. Prevalence of
these characteristics is likely to foster cognitions/perceptions
conducive to the formation of paranormal beliefs (i.e.,
proneness to experiencing strange perceptual and cognitive
sensations and/or magical interpretations of occurring events)
(Dagnall et al., 2010; Dembin´ska-Krajewska and Rybakowski,
2014).
Other O-LIFE dimensions [cognitive disorganization,
impulsive non-conformity (ImpNon) and introverted
anhedonia] relate less obviously to anomalous beliefs. Indeed,
cognitive disorganization (unconventional trains of thought;
disorganized thinking) and ImpNon (the failure to follow social
rules non-compliance with conventional or established social
roles; lack of self-control) only indirectly index elements of
anomalous thinking/beliefs. Accordingly, significant but weak
relationships were expected.
Regarding introverted anhedonia (blunted affect, antisocial
behavior and lack of ability to feel pleasure; negative schizotypy),
previous research evinces that negative aspects of schizotypy
are not primarily involved with the development of paranormal
beliefs. Instead, negative schizotypy plays a key role in the
affective interpretation of subjectively perceived paranormal
experiences (Irwin and Green, 1998; Schofield and Claridge,
2007). Hence, no significant association was anticipated between
paranormal belief and introverted anhedonia (Irwin and Green,
1998).
Consistent with Williams and Irwin (1991), the authors
hypothesized that belief in the paranormal would structure
cognitions and perceptions related to UnExp/magical ideation
and consequently, increase the tendency to perceive non-
causally events as related. Thus, whilst scores on high
schizotypy (particularly, UnExp) correlate negatively with tasks
assessing statistical bias, this relationship would be mediated
by level of paranormal belief. Operationally, this manifests as
decreased performance on tasks indexing perception of chance
(particularly, those assessing perception of randomness). The
notion that misrepresentation of chance is more strongly related
to belief in the paranormal corresponds with previous research
(Dagnall et al., 2014, 2016; Rogers, 2014) and Arnott’s (1998,
2006) taxonomy of decision biases, which arose as a response to
inadequacies within previous classification systems (e.g., Tversky
and Kahneman, 1974).
Within the taxonomy the statistical bias category, embraces
chance, mistaking random events for essential process
characteristics (Wagenaar, 1988) and conjunction (the
overestimation of probability in compound problems; Tversky
and Kahneman, 1983). The statistical bias category is central
to the present paper because it provides a rationale for why
propensity to conjunction fallacy is less strongly associated
with belief in the paranormal. This occurs because conjunction
fallacy represents a specific instance of misrepresentation of
chance (Dagnall et al., 2014, 2016; Rogers, 2014). Thus, whilst
misrepresentation of chance and proneness to conjunction
correlate positively, conjunction contributes little unique
variance. Although, predictions concerning relationships
between schizotypy, belief in the paranormal, and statistical
bias arose from careful consideration of previous research, no
prior work has investigated the inter-relationship between these
factors.
A further consideration was the fact that previous research
reports that the relationship between belief in the paranormal
and statistical bias varies as a function of belief type (Dagnall
et al., 2014, 2016). Poorer statistical performance is more strongly
associated with Traditional Paranormal Beliefs (TPB) than New
Age Philosophy (NAP). These dimensions reflect the differential
functioning of beliefs (individual vs. social) (Lange et al., 2000).
NAP (psi, witchcraft, spiritualism and astrology) instills control
over external events at the individual/personal level (Irwin,
1992), whilst TPBs (traditional religious beliefs, witchcraft and
precognition) regulates external events at a social cultural level
(Goode, 2000).
Preceding studies note that these functional differences
influence susceptibility to heuristic bias. Particularly, Dagnall
et al. (2014) in line with previous work (Hergovich et al., 2008;
Wilson, 2013) observed that whilst perception of randomness
correlated weakly with both NAP and TPBs, conjunction
correlated only with TPBs. Thus, TPBs should more strongly
relate to statistical bias than NAP, and the effect should be
stronger for misperception of randomness than proneness to
conjunction. Hence, the authors tentatively predicted that TPBs
would have a stronger mediating effect than NAP.
Finally, this study included paranormal problem types
alongside standard problem types. These index the degree
to which participants endorse paranormal explanations in
preference to optimal statistical solutions. The researchers
anticipated that performance on paranormal problems would
correlate negatively with schizotypy.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
A sample of 254 participants (69 male, 27% and 185 female, 73%)
took part in the study. Mean age 26.66, SD = 9.81, range 18–
71 years. Males, M = 28.84, SD = 10.52, range 20–65 years, and
females, M = 25.84, SD = 9.43, range 18–71 years. Participant
recruitment was via emails to university staff and students
and local stakeholders (businesses, leisure and vocational/sports
classes). The sample comprised 60% enrolled undergraduate
students (59% Psychology, 30% Health Care, and 11% Arts
and Humanities) and 40% non-students. Prior to participation,
a question asked whether participants had previously studied
heuristic bias. If participants endorsed the question, participation
discontinued.
Measures
Probabilistic Reasoning Tasks
Four problem types derived from Dagnall et al. (2007, 2014)
assessed probabilistic reasoning: perception of randomness,
conjunction fallacy, paranormal perception of randomness and
paranormal conjunction fallacy. Items were organized into five
counter-balanced sections, which contained one of each problem
type.
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After reading each problem, participants indicated the most
probable outcome from a range of alternatives.
Perception of Randomness
These problems evaluated participant’s ability to judge the
likelihood of strings/sequences (e.g., ‘imagine a coin was tossed
six times. Which pattern of results do you think is most likely?: (a)
HHHHHH, (b) HHHTTT, (c) HTHHTT, (d) all equally likely’).
Conjunction Fallacy
Participants selected the most probable outcome from presented
statements. Alternatives included single and co-occurring events
[e.g., ‘two football teams (Team A and Team B) are playing in
a local derby. What is the most likely outcome of the game?: (a)
Team A scores first, (b) Team A scores first and win, (c) Team
A scores first and loses, (d) Team A scores first and the game is
drawn’].
Paranormal Perception of Randomness
Items possessed the same underlying structure as standard
perception of randomness problems. The only differences
being that judgments about the likelihood of strings/sequences
occurred within a paranormal context. For example, ‘A famous
psychic, with renowned paranormal abilities, has successfully
predicted the outcome of the last six annually held boat races
between two famous English Universities’ [University A and
University B]. This year the psychic predicts University B will
win. Which of the following is most likely?: (a) University A
will win the event, (b) University B will win the event, (c)
University A and University B are both equally as likely to win
the event.
Paranormal Conjunction Fallacy
Similarly, paranormal conjunctions contextualized conjunctions
within a paranormal setting. Problems possessed the same
underlying structure as standard conjunctions; event intersection
probability could not exceed single (constituent) event likelihood
(cf. Tversky and Kahneman, 1982, 1983). For instance, ‘Andrew
often sits by the telephone at work. Just as he is thinking about
his friend (Elaine), she rings: (a) Elaine rang because Andrew was
thinking about her [event intersection], (b) Andrew was thinking
about Elaine because she was about to ring [event intersection],
(c) Elaine rang [single event].’
The Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and
Experiences (O-LIFE)
The O-LIFE brief is shortened version of the original 104-item
scale (Mason et al., 1995). The O-LIFE measures schizotypal
personality traits in non-clinical individuals. The O-LIFE brief
contains 43 items divided into four sub-scales: UnExp, Cognitive
Disorganization (CogDis), Introvertive Anhedonia (IntAn) and
ImpNon (Mason et al., 2005). The UnExps scale contains 12
items phenomenologically related to the positive symptoms
of psychosis and thus assesses positive schizotypy (perceptual
aberrations, magical thinking and hallucinations). The CogDis
sub-scale comprises 11 items reflecting thought disorder and
other disorganized aspects of psychosis. Particularly, items
tap poor attention/concentration, poor decision-making and
social anxiety. The IntAn sub-scale is composed of 10 items
measuring negative schizotypy (schizoid temperament). Items
assess lack of enjoyment from social and physical sources
of pleasure and avoidance of intimacy. The ImpNon scale
features 10 items generically indexing lack of self-control
(impulsive, anti-social, and eccentric forms of behavior). The
O-LIFE following its development has become widely used. The
scale possesses established psychometric qualities, particularly
high internal consistency (Mason et al., 1995) and test–
retest reliability (Burch et al., 1998). Since inception, clinical
and experimental studies have used the O-LIFE, establishing
its legitimacy, reliability and validity (Mason and Claridge,
2006).
Revised Paranormal Belief Scale (RPBS) (Tobacyk
and Milford, 1983; Tobacyk, 2004)
The RPBS is a 26-item self-report measure, which assesses belief
in the paranormal. The RPBS is the most widely used measure
of paranormal belief (Goulding and Parker, 2001). Questions are
presented as statements (e.g., ‘There is a devil’) and respondents
rate items on a seven-point Likert scale, ranging from 1
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Items measure seven
facets: traditional religious beliefs, spiritualism, extraordinary
life forms, psi, witchcraft, precognition and superstition.
The RPBS globally demonstrates satisfactory reliability; sub-
scale dimensionality, however, is uncertain (Cardena et al.,
2015). To address measurement concerns, Lange et al. (2000)
performed a Rasch scaling purification of the scale. This
produced two psychometrically superior factors; NAP (11-
items assesses belief in psi and survival of bodily death)
and TPB (five-items measure belief in concepts, such as the
devil, witchcraft, heaven and hell) (Cardena et al., 2015).
Rasch scaling demands that responses are recoded (0–6)
(Lange et al., 2000). Thus, total scores range from 0 to 156
(higher scores indicating belief in the paranormal). NAP Rasch
scores range from 6.85 to 47.72 and TPB 11.16 to 43.24
(Andrich, 1988). Overall, RPBS demonstrates adequate validity
(Tobacyk, 2004). Both subscales demonstrate minimal item
response bias (gender and age), possess predictive validity and
are unidimensional. The RPBS overall, is a psychometrically
satisfactory measure of belief in the paranormal (Tobacyk,
2004).
The presentation order of paranormal belief and schizotypy
measures was counter-balanced across participants.
Procedure
Prior to testing ethical approval was granted as part of a research
project examining the relationship between anomalous beliefs
and cognitive-perceptual measures. Potential participants read an
information sheet before consenting to the study. After providing
informed consent, participants received the booklet containing
the measures. Instructions asked participants to take their time
and answer questions as openly and honestly as possible. The
booklet contained four sections: personal information (always
completed first), problem solving, O-LIFE and belief in the
paranormal. On completion of the booklet, participants were
debriefed.
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Data Analysis Plan
Justification and General Analytical Strategy
Prior to structural equation modeling (SEM) data screening
was undertaken. Then means, standard deviations and bivariate
correlations for each scale were calculated. SEM characterizes
hypothetical constructs as latent variables, which represent
interrelated measures or observed variables. Fit indices evaluate
the degree to which observed data support specified theoretical
models. In the context of the present study, mediation analysis
was performed to determine whether level of paranormal
belief explained the relationship between schizotypy and
propensity to statistical bias (misperception of randomness
and conjunction error). Social science research frequently
employs mediational analysis because it identifies and elucidates
the process that underlies a reported relationship between
observed variables. Analysis in the current study used AMOS
version 22.
Prior to model evaluation, confirmatory factor analysis
ensured sequential estimation of measures was appropriate
(Anderson and Gerbing, 1988). SEM included an analysis of
general mediation; this assessed the hypothesis that schizotypy
had both direct and indirect effects on statistical bias. Particularly,
the notion that belief in the paranormal mediated the schizotypy-
statistical bias relationship. Mediation was determined by
consulting bootstrapping estimates of indirect effects.
Structural equation modeling conventions necessitate a
comparison of alternative models, when more than one a
priori model is available (within the alternative model proposed
mediator effects are restricted to zero). The degree to which
the less restrictive model better fits the data provides an
indication of the significance of the mediator. For comparison
purposes, an additional alternative model was tested in which
statistical bias was suggested to mediate the relationship
between schizotypy and paranormal belief. Finally, consideration
of partial correlations indicated whether level of schizotypy
associated with endorsement of problems framed in a paranormal
context.
Fit Indices
Several indices evaluated model fit (the maximum likelihood
chi-square statistic, χ2; the Root Mean Square Error of
Approximation, RMSEA; Standardized Root Mean Square
Residual, SRMR; and the Comparative Fit Index, CFI) (Hu
and Bentler, 1999). Traditionally, chi-square assesses absolute
fit, the degree to which a priori model fits or reproduces data.
Chi-square, however, is sensitive to sample size and frequently
rejects structural models derived from large samples (Kline,
2005). Hence, RMSEA and SRMR are also typically used. RMSEA
measures the difference between the population covariance
matrix and the reproduced covariance matrix, in order to control
for sampling variability. Strength of the RMSEA is that it has a
confidence interval (CI), which provides an indication of how
precise the fit of a model is. SRMR provides the square root of the
discrepancy between the model covariance matrix and the sample
covariance matrix.
Relative fit considers relationship between the chi-square
from the proposed model with the null/baseline model (i.e.,
Comparative Fit Index – CFI, Cronbach, 1990). Specifically,
CFI compares the chi-square of the hypothesized model with a
model that assumes all relationships among measured variables
are zero (independence model). CFI values above 0.90 indicate
good fit and values above 0.95 specify very good model fit
(Hu and Bentler, 1999). In line with previous research (e.g.,
Bong et al., 2013), CFI values above 0.88 can be considered to
indicate marginal fit. An acceptable model requires RMSEA less
than 0.10, SRMR less than 0.08 (Browne and Cudeck, 1993),
and a CFI greater than 0.88 (Bong et al., 2013). For reporting
RMSEA values, the 90% CI was included. Furthermore, Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC; Akaike, 1974) evaluated model fit;
smaller values indicate better models.
RESULTS
Scale Properties and Inter-Measure
Correlations
The O-LIFE demonstrated good internal reliability, Cronbach’s
alpha (α = 0.87). The UnExps (α = 0.76) and CogDis (α = 0.81)
subscales possessed acceptable and good internal reliability
respectively. IntAn (α = 0.66) and ImpNon (α = 0.64) fell
below the frequently cited α = 0.70 level of acceptability. This
was not problematic because 0.60, allowing for measurement
error in psychological/social science, represents an acceptable
level (Nunnally, 1978; Lance et al., 2006). Observed alpha values
were consistent with those reported by Mason et al. (2005). The
Revised Paranormal Belief Scale (RPBS) demonstrated excellent
internal reliability, Cronbach’s alpha (α = 0.94). The NAP
(α = 0.88) and TPB (α = 0.82) subscales possessed good internal
reliability (George and Mallery, 2003). Total schizotypy (O-LIFE)
and all schizotypy subscales except IntAn indicated significant
positive correlations with paranormal beliefs. Of the schizotypy
subscales, UnExps possessed the strongest correlations with
paranormal beliefs (see Table 1).
Problem Type Descriptive Statistics
Problem solution scores were calculated (perception of
randomness, conjunction fallacy, paranormal perception of
randomness, paranormal conjunction fallacy, overall standard,
and overall paranormal). These are presented as means and
proportions alongside inter-problem correlations in Table 2.
Pearson product moment revealed positive correlations between
problem types.
Belief in the Paranormal, Schizotypy and
Problem Task Solution
A further set of Pearson product moment correlations found
negative associations between belief in the paranormal and
schizotypy and problem types (see Table 3), particularly UnExps
and TPBs.
Structural Equation Modeling
Examination of inter variable zero-order correlations revealed
that belief in the paranormal was most strongly associated
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TABLE 1 | Scale descriptive information and inter-scale pearson correlations.
α M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
(1) O-LIFE 0.87 14.93 7.73
(2) Unusual experiences 0.76 3.67 2.71 0.79∗∗
(3) Cognitive disorganization 0.81 5.36 3.18 0.85∗∗ 0.53∗∗
(4) Introvertive Anhedonia 0.66 2.38 2.09 0.56∗∗ 0.25∗∗ 0.32∗∗
(5) Impulsive non-conformity 0.64 3.52 2.20 0.78∗∗ 0.55∗∗ 0.58∗∗ 0.25∗∗
(6) RPBS 0.94 72.44 20.30 0.25∗∗ 0.35∗∗ 0.19∗∗ −0.03 0.19∗∗
(7) NAP 0.88 29.30 5.55 0.23∗∗ 0.30∗∗ 0.18∗∗ 0.01 0.18∗∗ 0.85∗∗
(8) TPB 0.82 20.85 5.75 0.23∗∗ 0.33∗∗ 0.19∗∗ −0.01 0.16∗∗ 0.86∗∗ 0.72∗∗
O-LIFE, The Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences; RPBS, Revised Paranormal Belief Scale; NAP, New Age Philosophy; TPB, Traditional Paranormal
Belief, ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01.
TABLE 2 | Problem task descriptive information and inter-item pearson correlations.
M SD Proportion SD 1 2 3 4
(1) Perception of randomness 3.76 1.08 0.75 0.22
(2) Conjunction fallacy 1.94 1.31 0.39 0.26 0.21∗∗
(3) Paranormal perception of randomness 4.29 1.10 0.86 0.22 0.39∗∗ 0.14∗
(4) Paranormal conjunction fallacy 4.41 1.16 0.88 0.23 0.24∗∗ 0.26∗∗ 0.51∗∗
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01.
TABLE 3 | Pearson correlations between problem solving task performance, schizotypy and belief in the paranormal.
O-LIFE UE CD IA IN RPBS NAP TPB
Perception of randomness −0.15∗ −0.17∗∗ −0.11∗ −0.03 −0.12∗ −0.25∗∗ −0.17∗∗ −0.28∗∗
Conjunction fallacy −0.11∗ −0.14∗ −0.10 0.00 −0.07 −0.17∗∗ −0.10 −0.19∗∗
Paranormal perception of randomness −0.14∗ −0.15∗∗ −0.05 −0.10∗ −0.14∗ −0.38∗∗ −0.31∗∗ −0.31∗∗
Paranormal conjunction fallacy −0.24∗∗ −0.32∗∗ −0.15∗∗ −0.11∗ −0.13∗ −0.49∗∗ −0.40∗∗ −0.40∗∗
O-LIFE, The Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences; UE, Unusual Experiences; CD, Cognitive Disorganization; IA, Introverted Anhedonia, IN, Impulsive
Non-conformity, RPBS, Revised Paranormal Belief Scale; NAP, New Age Philosophy; TPB, Traditional Paranormal Belief, ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01.
with the UnExps factor of schizotypy. Hence, corresponding
with predictions, subsequent SEM analyses focused on UnExp.
Following confirmatory factor analyses (CFA), SEM assessed
the hypothesis that UnExp had both direct and indirect effects
on statistical bias. Mediation was determined by consulting
bootstrapping estimates of indirect effects and assessed two
models: model 1 examined the role of TPB, and model 2
considered the role of NAP. As outlined in the introduction,
previous research reports that proneness to statistical bias
varies as a function of belief type. Specifically, TPB correlates
more strongly with general propensity to statistical bias
than NAP.
Confirmatory Factor Analyses
Analysis involved theoretically driven CFA on each selected
scale (UnExp, RPBS standard problem types, and problems
couched within a paranormal context). The UnExp subscale,
according to research, represents a single factor. The model
based on supporting research for the RPBS was a two-factor
correlated model consisting of Traditional Paranormal New Age
and Philosophy Beliefs factors. Models for standard problem
types and paranormal problems were also two-factor correlated
models.
The single factor model for UnExps reported a significant
chi-square and unsatisfactory model fit for CFI, marginal fit for
RMSEA and SRMR: χ2(54, N = 254) = 157.07, p < 0.001;
CFI = 0.79; RMSEA = 0.08 (CI of 0.07–0.10); SRMR = 0.07.
Further inspection revealed poor factor loadings on the UnExps
subscale of items 1 and 9 (0.25 and 0.22 respectively) and so
were dropped from the CFA, resulting in a good overall model fit:
χ2(31, N = 254) = 58.91, p < 0.05; CFI = 0.94; RMSEA = 0.06
(CI of 0.04–0.08); SRMR = 0.05. Comparison of AIC values
supported the superior fit of the factor model following removal
of items 1 and 9. The AIC value for the original model was
higher (229.07 and 126.91 respectively). For the two-factor model
for the RPBS, results showed that although the chi-square was
significant, χ2(99, N = 254) = 345.29, p < 0.001, the fit indices
met the criteria for a marginal fit: CFI= 0.88; RMSEA= 0.10 (CI
of 0.96–0.12); SRMR= 0.07.
The two-factor correlated model for standard problems
reported a non-significant chi-square and the fit indices met
the criteria for a good fit: χ2(34, N = 254) = 47.83, p > 0.05;
CFI = 0.92; RMSEA = 0.04 (CI of 0.01–0.07); SRMR = 0.05.
However, scale scrutiny revealed a poor factor loading for
problem 16 (0.12). Removing this item from the model resulted in
a more parsimonious solution:χ2(26,N = 254)= 36.51, p> 0.05;
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CFI = 0.94; RMSEA = 0.04 (CI of 0.01–0.07); SRMR = 0.05.
Comparison of the AIC values supported the superior fit of
the factor model with item 16 removed, as the AIC value of
the original model is higher than for the model with item 16
removed (109.84 and 92.52 respectively). Finally, the two-factor
correlated model for problems in a paranormal context indicated
a significant chi-square, χ2(33, N = 254) = 95.63, p < 0.001, yet
all other fit indices met the criteria for acceptable fit: CFI = 0.90;
RMSEA= 0.08 (CI of 0.06–0.11); SRMR= 0.05.
Overall, results suggest that the theoretically driven two-factor
correlated models satisfactorily represent paranormal beliefs,
standard problems and problems in a paranormal context; and
that a single factor adequately explains UnExps.
The adequacy of the factor solutions can be also determined
in relation to parameter estimates. All factor loadings were
positive and statistically significant; all items possessed factor
loadings greater than the minimum threshold of 0.32 (Tabachnick
and Fidell, 2001). Compliant with the strict factor loading
requirements of Hair et al. (1998) the majority of indicators
exhibited factor loadings above 0.60.
Composite Reliability
Latent modeling cautions that traditional measures of internal
reliability (i.e., Cronbach’s α) over or underestimate scale
reliability (Raykov, 2002). Hence, composite reliability provides
a more rigorous assessment of internal reliability. When
considering composite reliability, values greater than 0.60 are
acceptable (Diamantopoulos and Siguaw, 2000). Results for the
standard problems indicated that perception of randomness
(PR) (ρc = 0.62) and conjunction fallacy (CF) (ρc = 0.60)
possessed satisfactory composite reliability. Problems framed
in a paranormal context, PPR and PCF indicated satisfactory
composite reliability (ρc = 0.80 and ρc = 0.65 respectively), as
did UnExp (ρc = 0.75). Finally, TPB and NAP, demonstrated
also satisfactory composite reliability (ρc = 0.78 and ρc = 0.88
respectively).
Model Test: Schizotypy, Paranormal
Belief and Standard Problem Types
Traditional Paranormal Beliefs
The mediation model in which TPB subscale had both direct
and indirect effects on statistical bias (standard problem types of
conjunction fallacy vs. perception of randomness) (Figure 1) was
statistically significant, χ2(239, N = 254) = 371.92 p < 0.001.
Fit indices indicated an acceptable data-model fit: CFI = 0.90;
RMSEA= 0.04 (CI of 0.03–0.05); SRMR= 0.07. Inspection of the
structural path from UnExp to TPB revealed a significant positive
effect of UnExp on TPB (β = 0.31, p < 0.001). Furthermore,
TPB had a significant negative effect on both perception of
randomness (β = −0.39, p < 0.001) and conjunction fallacy
(β=−0.25, p< 0.05). UnExp and TPB accounted for 19% of the
variance in perception of randomness, and accounted for 9% of
the variance in conjunction fallacy. To formally test whether TPB
acted as a mediator, a model was specified where the paths from
TPB to UnExp and standard beliefs were constrained to zero. In
this model, fit indices indicated an unacceptable model fit on all
criteria, but RMSEA, χ2(242, N = 254) = 418.58, p < 0.001,
CFI = 0.87, RMSEA = 0.05 (CI of 0.04–0.06), SRMR = 0.11.
Referring to the AIC statistic for the mediation model vs. the
constrained model for TPB, the mediation model demonstrated
superior fit, as the AIC is 541.93, which is lower than the
constrained model (AIC= 582.59).
The constrained model indicated a significant negative path
between UnExp and PR (β = −0.23, p < 0.05), but not between
UnExp and CF (β=−0.13, p> 0.05). In the final model, however,
the path from UnExp to PR was non-significant (β = −0.10,
p > 0.05). Bootstrapping estimates indicated that UnExp had a
lower-bounds indirect effect on PR of −0.25 and upper-bounds
indirect effect of−0.07 with p< 0.01. This indicated that UnExp
had a significant indirect effect on PR. The absence of a significant
path between UnExp and CF once TPB was constrained to zero
suggests UnExp did not significantly influence CF through TPB.
These latter findings suggest that TPB mediated the effect of
UnExp on PR, but not CF.
An alternative model was tested in which statistical bias (CF
and PR) was proposed to mediate the relationship between
UnExp and TPB. Paths between TPB and statistical bias were
reversed in this model. Fit indices remained the same, given
only direction was adjusted. However, inspection of the paths
suggested statistical bias did not fully mediate the relationship
between UnExp and TPB, as the path between TPB and UE
remained significant (β = 0.20, p < 0.05) with the inclusion of
statistical bias to this relationship.
New Age Philosophy
The mediation model in which NAP had both direct and indirect
effects on statistical bias (conjunction fallacy vs. perception
of randomness) (Figure 2) was statistically significant, χ2(392,
N = 254)= 631.08, p< 0.001. Further, consideration of fit indices
revealed an acceptable data-model fit: CFI= 0.89; RMSEA= 0.05
(CI of 0.04–0.06); SRMR = 0.07. Examination of the structural
path from UnExp to NAP revealed NAP had a significant positive
effect (β = 0.31, p < 0.001), and a significant negative effect
on perception of randomness (β = −0.31, p < 0.001) but not
on conjunction fallacy (β = −0.17, p > 0.05). UnExp and NAP
accounted for 15% of the variance in PR, and explained 6% of the
variance in CF.
To test formally the mediating role of NAP, the model specified
paths from NAP to UnExp and statistical bias were constrained to
zero. In this model, fit indices indicated an unacceptable model
fit on all criteria, but RMSEA, χ2(395, N = 254) = 666.33,
p < 0.001, CFI = 0.88, RMSEA = 0.05 (CI of 0.04–0.06),
SRMR = 0.10. Referring to the AIC statistic for the mediation
model vs. the constrained model for NAP, the mediation model
demonstrated superior fit, as the AIC is 837.08, which is lower
than the constrained model (AIC = 866.33). The constrained
model indicated that UnExp had a significant negative effect on
PR (β = −0.23, p < 0.05), but not on CF (β = −0.18, p > 0.05).
In the final model, however, the path from UnExp to both PR and
CF was non-significant (β = −0.14, p > 0.05; and β = −0.13,
p > 0.05 respectively). Bootstrapping estimates indicated that
UnExp possessed a lower-bounds indirect effect on PR of −0.16
and upper-bounds indirect effect of −0.03 with p < 0.05. This
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FIGURE 1 | Model 1 – Mediation model depicting the relationship between unusual experiences and standard problem types, as mediated by
traditional paranormal belief. Latent variables are represented by ellipses, measured variables are represented by squares, and e indicates error of measurement.
Lines between latent variables indicate standardized coefficients; ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01.
indicated that UnExp had a significant indirect effect on PR,
and hence NAP mediated the effect of UnExp on perception
of randomness. As with model 1, the absence of a significant
path between UnExp and CF after constraining NAP to zero
suggested that UnExp did not significantly influence CF through
NAP.
As with Model 1, an alternative model was tested in which
statistical bias (CF and PR) was proposed to mediate the
relationship between UnExp and NAP. Paths between NAP
and statistical bias were reversed and fit indices remained the
same, given only direction was adjusted. Inspection of the paths
suggested statistical bias did not fully mediate the relationship
between UnExp and NAP, as the path between NAP and UE
remained significant (β = 0.22, p < 0.05) with the inclusion of
statistical bias to this relationship.
Schizotypy and Paranormal Problem
Types
Analysis of paranormal problems omitted belief in the
paranormal due to methodological concerns (see Dagnall
et al., 2016). Correlating paranormal problems with belief
in the paranormal is problematic because it potentially
conflates belief and bias. Specifically, problem similarity
(shared paranormal context), increases the positive correlation
between problem types and reduces bias discriminatory power.
Hence, partial correlation identified unique variance between
UnExps (schizotypy) and paranormal problem types.
The relationship between paranormal perception of
randomness and UnExps (controlling for paranormal
conjunction fallacy) was not significant, r = −0.01, df = 251,
p > 0.05. However, a significant positive correlation was
observed between for paranormal conjunction fallacy and
UnExps (controlling for paranormal perception of randomness),
r =−0.28, df= 251, p< 0.001.
Conclusion
Paranormal belief factors (TPB and NAP) mediated the
relationship between UnExp and perception of randomness, but
not between UnExp and conjunction fallacy. TPB demonstrated
stronger relationships than NAP with both UnExp and standard
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FIGURE 2 | Model 2 – Mediation model depicting the relationship between unusual experiences and standard problem types, as mediated by new
age philosophy. Latent variables are represented by ellipses, measured variables are represented by squares, and e indicates error of measurement. Lines between
latent variables indicate standardized coefficients; ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01.
problems. Context influenced the relationship between UnExp
and statistical bias. Conjunction problems presented in a
paranormal context (controlling for perception of randomness)
positively correlated with UnExp. Whilst no association
between perception of randomness and UnExp (controlling for
conjunction) was observed.
DISCUSSION
As hypothesized, the O-LIFE UnExps subscale was most strongly
associated with belief in the paranormal. UnExp moderately
positively correlated with paranormal measures (overall
paranormal belief; TPB; and NAP). This finding supported
previous work delineating a relationship between positive
schizotypy (proneness to experiencing strange perceptual-
cognitive sensations and magical interpretations) and belief in
the paranormal (Hergovich et al., 2008; Dagnall et al., 2010;
Dembin´ska-Krajewska and Rybakowski, 2014).
Whilst UnExp and belief in the paranormal correlated
negatively with performance on problem tasks, consideration of
zero-order correlations revealed that belief in the paranormal,
particularly TPB, was more strongly associated with proneness to
statistical bias. As expected, TPB correlated with both perception
of randomness and conjunction fallacy, whilst NAP was
associated only with perception of randomness. Results aligned
with previous work, which reported a stronger relationship
between TPB (vs. NAP) and susceptibility to heuristic bias
(Wilson, 2013; Dagnall et al., 2014). Overall, findings concurred
with the notion that conjunction bias (in this context) represents
a specific instance of misrepresentation of chance (Arnott, 1998,
2006; Rogers, 2014; Dagnall et al., 2016).
Paranormal belief factors mediated the relationship between
UnExp and perception of randomness, but not UnExp and
conjunction fallacy. TPB (vs. NAP) demonstrated stronger
relationships with UnExp and standard problems. Particularly,
correlations between TPB, UnExp and perception of randomness
(compared to conjunction) reflected this. Alternative models
(one a constrained model and the other with statistical bias
conceptualized as a mediator) were weaker in comparison with
the hypothesized model. This provided support for the role of
paranormal belief as a mediator.
The presence of mediation supports the postulation that
belief in the paranormal acts as a framework for shaping
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schizotypal related cognitions (odd beliefs and/or magical
thinking) (Williams and Irwin, 1991). This interpretation aligns
with the notion of a paranormal worldview (Zusne and Jones,
1982). This is a broad perspective that references events to
intangible mental and metaphysical processes, rather than
observable/physical factors. From this viewpoint, belief in the
paranormal represents a coherent, internally logical set of
explanations for unusual phenomenon. Within the worldview,
proneness to statistical bias is largely attributable to a subjective
preferential thinking style, rather than a defective understanding
of probability.
The finding that mediation occurred for misrepresentation
of chance and not conjunction is with hindsight predictable
because proneness to conjunction (vs. perception of randomness)
relates less strongly to belief in the paranormal (Dagnall et al.,
2014, 2016). Indirectly, this finding provides further support
for the notion that conjunction (in this context) represents
a specific instance of misrepresentation of chance (Arnott,
1998, 2006; Rogers, 2014). Conjunction indexes less unique
variance (as evidenced by weaker effect sizes and inconsistently
reported findings). Misperception of randomness accounted
for the majority of variance within the UnExp-statistical bias
relationship. This was similar to the previously delineated
model for belief in the paranormal, however, the relationship
between UnExp and statistical bias was weaker (∼7% vs. 3%
variance).
Within this study, a framing effect occurred; problems
couched within a paranormal context proved easier to solve
(standard: perception of randomness 75% and conjunction 39%
vs. paranormal: perception of randomness 86% and conjunction
88%). This finding was commensurate with previous studies (see;
Rogers et al., 2009, 2011; Dagnall et al., 2016). Placing problems in
a paranormal context reduces their discriminatory power because
framing conflates belief in the paranormal with statistical bias.
Thus, it becomes unclear whether believers endorse incorrect
solutions because of their level of belief or their susceptibility to
statistical error. Accordingly, whilst problems in a paranormal
context are easier to solve, this advantage reduces as a function
of belief in the paranormal. Indeed, performance on conjunction
tasks increased markedly when the problems were located within
a paranormal setting (vs. everyday situation).
Framing strengthened the association between UnExp and
conjunction fallacy. This may occur because paranormal settings
make conjunctions (event co-occurrence) particularly appealing
to individuals scoring high on UnExp. Problem structure may
suggest/infer a direct causal relationship between constituent
elements. A recent paper by Rogers et al. (2016) supports this
notion. They found that believers in the paranormal were prone
to endorsing conjunctions when a succeeding event confirmed
(provided evidence for) the first. For individuals high in UnExp,
the paranormal context supports ideations related to magical
thinking, unusual beliefs and odd associations. Clearly, this does
not apply in the context of paranormal perception of randomness
problems, where participants merely estimate the probability
of an event/outcome. This suggests that context may affect
conjunction susceptibility, whilst perception of randomness is
relatively domain general.
Clearly, more work is required in this area. Generally,
assessing the degree to which susceptibility to statistical bias
varies as a function of context and belief type. Whilst,
belief in the paranormal is associated with misperception of
randomness, other anomalous beliefs appear more strongly
related to proneness to conjunction. Notably, Brotherton and
French (2014) found that participants who more strongly (vs.
weak) endorsed conspiracy theories made more conjunction
errors.
These recent examples suggest that belief type/structure
qualifies proneness to statistical bias. In the case of conspiracies,
perceived co-occurrence of events is more important than
estimation of probability. By their nature, conspiracies are
unlikely to be true (Grimes, 2016). Support for conspiracies
occurs, when perceived inadequacies in prevailing explanations
(A) result in the endorsement of an alternative account (B)
(B is dependent on A). This parallels the underlying structure
of conjunction error; in order for B to be true A must be
false. For example, conspiracists view inaccuracies within the
official Roswell, 1947 incident as evidence that an alien spacecraft
crashed (Thomas, 1995; Nickell, 2009).
Before concluding, the authors acknowledge that the
mediation model used in this paper was cross-sectional.
Therefore, findings provide only correlational evidence.
Furthermore, scholars report that cross-sectional data sometimes
provide biased estimates (Maxwell and Cole, 2007). It is
thus important for future research to carry out longitudinal
assessments to demonstrate fully a causal relationship from
schizotypy to statistical bias through paranormal belief. In
relation to this limitation, it is noteworthy that there are
theoretical arguments supporting the more primitive status
of schizotypal traits over paranormal beliefs. In particular,
schizotypy is a trait-like construct with a notable genetic
component (see for example Ericson et al., 2011), and schizotypal
traits (including UnExp) are less malleable than paranormal
beliefs. In addition, paranormal beliefs act as an interpretive
framework, which offer structure to schizotypal traits such
as UnExp (Williams and Irwin, 1991). From this perspective,
it is logical that schizotypal traits influence statistical bias
through paranormal beliefs. Weaker observed effects within the
alternative model, where statistical bias was conceptualized as
a mediator, provided further support for the direction of the
hypothesized relationships. Accordingly, the interpretation of
the current mediation models is more theoretically plausible
than alternatives, which posit schizotypy or statistical bias as
mediators.
There are factors, which potentially limit the generalisability
of this paper’s findings. These include failure to employ exclusion
criteria, educational level and participant gender. With regard
to exclusion criteria, paper reviewers identified variables that
potentially could influence or confound results (i.e., psychiatric
morbidity, substance misuse and exposure to religion). Other
similar work has not identified these factors as problematic
or employed exclusion criteria (Hergovich et al., 2008; Darwin
et al., 2011). Consistent with this approach, which is typical to
working with general adult populations, the authors assumed
that routine data screening would eliminate extreme outlying
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data points; control for potentially confounding scores. With
regard to consideration of level of education (academic
qualifications), no direct measure was necessary. Preceding work
reports that statistical bias proneness is a robust phenomenon,
largely unaffected by educational variables, such as level of
statistical awareness (Tversky and Kahneman, 1983; Fisk, 2004).
Moreover, level of education provides only an indirect index of
general cognitive ability (McClelland, 1973). Finally, there was
no consideration of gender differences; prior research within the
area of paranormal belief and statistical bias has failed to either
test or report gender differences. Future work may wish to explore
whether these factors influence relationships between belief in the
paranormal, schizotypy and statistical bias.
Finally, it is important to acknowledge that potential
for sample bias exists within paranormal-related studies.
Particularly, individuals interested in the paranormal are more
inclined to participate in associated research because of the
inherent appeal of the subject matter. Subsequently, samples
may under represent non-believers scoring high on schizotypy.
Accordingly, paranormal believers’ tendency to self-select may
produce an overestimation of the relationship between belief and
schizotypy. For this reason, caution is required when interpreting
results.
CONCLUSION
Within clinical groups, there is a well-established relationship
between psychosis, cognitive bias and jumping to conclusions
(Hassanali et al., 2015). Collectively, evidence suggests that
reasoning abnormalities may correlate positively with the
formation of unusual beliefs (Lawrence and Peters, 2004).
Within the present study, relationships between schizotypy and
proneness to statistical bias were weak. Indeed, as proposed
by Williams and Irwin (1991), belief in the paranormal played
an important mediating effect. Paranormal belief provided
a framework for interpreting cognitive-perceptual factors
of schizotypy, which resulted in increased susceptibility to
misperception of randomness (schizotypy influenced statistical
bias through paranormal belief).
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